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Re: Questions--Apple Technote about Leopard Kerberos Imaging
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Re: Questions--Apple Technote about Leopard Kerberos Imaging



Thanks everyone for your help.

I'm glad to hear that it "works", though I'm still unclear as to exactly what that means. Does "working" simply mean one no longer receives an alert that the computer already exists when binding to OD? What are the implications of the AuthenticationAuthority Kerberos related values, for each local user in the local directory service? Ought we be deleting these as well?

As an example, suppose your image source contains a local user of jdoe. Part of jdoe's directory services information will be user record has an attribute of AuthenticationAuthority, of which one of the strings looks something like--
";Kerberosv5 ;;username@LKDC:SHA1.reallylongHEXstring;LKDC:SHA1.reallylongHEXstring;"


Suppose we have either blown away the KDC, or that we use the System Image Utility from 10.5.6 or later and that we put this image on 10,000 Macs. So now we have a bunch of Macs that all have unique KDCs, but they have an identical user named jdoe having the same Kerberos hex string identifier. Normally, if we had created a user named jdoe on these same Macs, wouldn't that hex string identifier be different for each and every one of them? Maybe this is not an issue, but it seems natural to wonder if there aren't some behavioral differences caused by all those jdoes having the same identifier.

We haven't yet used InstaDMG. (Plan to try both it and Deploy Studio, but haven't yet.) One can see how it avoids the alert. But, it isn't clear how it removes these other issues. If one follows the InstaDMG process and creates local users, what about Kerberos string in their directory services user records? Or are InstaDMG users simply not putting the Kerberos string in their user records? This would appear to bypass the alert problem. But don't these users loose access to some KDC functionality?

I think one of the implications is that one needs to have a very good understanding of Kerberos works on Leopard clients, or risk unexpected behaviors when imaging. This email is an implicit admission that I don't have that understanding. The fact that it took Apple until 10.5.6 to identify this bug would suggest that it is non-trivial. And while I fully expect to learn more, I'm not sure where to start. This is a bit deeper than the Apple documentation seems to go.

Best Wishes,

Paul
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References: 
 >Questions--Apple Technote about Leopard Kerberos Imaging (From: Paul Cook <email@hidden>)



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