Re: [Fed-Talk] Infiltrate the Vault: Security Analysis and Decryption of Lion Full Disk Encryption
Re: [Fed-Talk] Infiltrate the Vault: Security Analysis and Decryption of Lion Full Disk Encryption
- Subject: Re: [Fed-Talk] Infiltrate the Vault: Security Analysis and Decryption of Lion Full Disk Encryption
- From: Dave Schroeder <email@hidden>
- Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2012 16:37:32 -0500
For the benefit of others following along:
With all of the computing power currently on earth, it would take longer than the age of the universe to brute-force crack AES. We created AES to protect our own information. AES-256, for example, is suitable for the protection of TOP SECRET/SCI information.
This paper has reverse-engineered the FileVault 2 encryption schema, but still requires the decryption keys or the user's password. The authors estimate that a brute-force attack on a strong FileVault 2 password would take 2^30 seconds, or 34 years.
Please stop insinuating that AES is crackable.
- Dave
On Aug 27, 2012, at 9:31 AM, "Pike, Michael (IHS/HQ)" <email@hidden> wrote:
> How can this be???
>
> Schroeder and others assured me it was not crackable. Not even by NSA.
>
> Mike
>
> Sent via my iOS 6 Device
>
> On Aug 27, 2012, at 8:04 AM, "Jeffrey Walton" <email@hidden> wrote:
>
>> http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>> With the launch of Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), Apple has introduced a volume
>> encryption mechanism known as FileVault 2. Apple only disclosed
>> marketing aspects of the closed-source software, e.g. its use of the
>> AES-XTS tweakable encryption, but a publicly available security
>> evaluation and detailed description was unavailable until now.
>>
>> We have performed an extensive analysis of FileVault 2 and we have
>> been able to find all the algorithms and parameters needed to
>> successfully read an encrypted volume. This allows us to perform
>> forensic investigations on encrypted volumes using our own tools.
>>
>> In this paper we present the architecture of FileVault 2, giving
>> details of the key derivation, encryption process and metadata
>> structures needed to perform the volume decryption. Besides the
>> analysis of the system, we have also built a library that can mount a
>> volume encrypted with FileVault 2. As a contribution to the research
>> and forensic communities we have made this library open source.
>>
>> Additionally, we present an informal security evalua- tion of the
>> system and comment on some of the design and implementation features.
>> Among others we analyze the random number generator used to create the
>> recovery password. We have also analyzed the entropy of each 512-byte
>> block in the encrypted volume and discovered that part of the user
>> data was left unencrypted.
>> ...
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