site_archiver@lists.apple.com Delivered-To: darwin-dev@lists.apple.com On Jul 25, 2007, at 12:04 PM, darwin-dev-request@lists.apple.com wrote: As a general rule, if you think you want to initiate operations on files, file attributes, pathnames etc. from the kernel you have made a design error and need to stop and re-evaluate what you are doing. That's usually true although I don't see any other method that is more elegant - maybe you do, so let me explain what I'm trying to do : === - open() is hooked with Kauth - if there is some special extended attribute set on the opening file, handle some security issues before returning a file descriptor, else, return the proper fd. === Do you see any other way to keep track of the files handled by the security module? (please note that the extended attribute holds some meaningful data for the kernel) Sure, now we can question about the purpose of the security module, why it has to rely on userspace data, etc... but focusing on the approach I've described, do you see any other solution to keep track about which files to handle in a special manner? In almost every case, what you are trying to do should be handled in user space. = Mike _______________________________________________ Do not post admin requests to the list. They will be ignored. Darwin-dev mailing list (Darwin-dev@lists.apple.com) Help/Unsubscribe/Update your Subscription: http://lists.apple.com/mailman/options/darwin-dev/site_archiver%40lists.appl... When you say "holds some meaningful data for the kernel", I assume that what you mean is that it holds some meaningful data for your decision-making code. You haven't given any sort of criteria here to work with, so of course I can't answer you. I'd say this is an exception. If there was KPI exposed for reading extended attributes, then yes. Unfortunately there is no such KPI exposed, and so you're in a position where you will have to ship your operation out to user space. I would, however, also file an enhancement request at bugreporter.apple.com asking for an interface to do what you want inside the kernel. In your case, providing you're only trying to operate on the file that's the object of the authorisation operation, you're right - your case is a legitimate exception. This email sent to site_archiver@lists.apple.com