Re: MD5 [was: [NSPipe pipe] returning nil (running out of filehandles?)]
Re: MD5 [was: [NSPipe pipe] returning nil (running out of filehandles?)]
- Subject: Re: MD5 [was: [NSPipe pipe] returning nil (running out of filehandles?)]
- From: Jens Alfke <email@hidden>
- Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 13:52:50 -0700
On 2 Apr '08, at 9:12 AM, John Stiles wrote:
And AFAIK nobody is even remotely close to finding a technique which
would let you write arbitrary data and then tack on a few bytes to
get the signature you want,
From the Wikipedia article:
Because MD5 makes only one pass over the data, if two prefixes with
the same hash can be constructed, a common suffix can be added to both
to make the collision more reasonable.
Because the current collision-finding techniques allow the preceding
hash state to be specified arbitrarily, a collision can be found for
any desired prefix; that is, for any given string of characters X, two
colliding files can be determined which both begin with X.
All that is required to generate two colliding files is a template
file, with a 128-byte block of data aligned on a 64-byte boundary,
that can be changed freely by the collision-finding algorithm.
Recently, a number of projects have created MD5 "rainbow tables" which
are easily accessible online, and can be used to reverse many MD5
hashes into strings that collide with the original input, usually for
the purposes of password cracking. However, if passwords are combined
with asalt before the MD5 digest is generated, rainbow tables become
much less useful.
and that's what I'd call "fully broken," at least that's what you'd
need to find in order to make an exploit.
That depends on what the digest is being used for — different
cryptographic protocols rely on different features of the underlying
algorithms. In some circumstances simply finding any hash collision
could be enough to break security. (Schneier's "Advanced Cryptography"
has several examples where a seemingly irrelevant weakness in an
underlying algorithm led to an attack on a higher level protocol that
used it. I believe the sad case of WEP was one.)
—Jens
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