Of colorful scepticism
Of colorful scepticism
- Subject: Of colorful scepticism
- From: Henrik Holmegaard <email@hidden>
- Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 14:26:11 +0200
Let's take a coca-cola can. You 'see' coca-cola red, right? You would
like to reproduce this coca-cola red on a device. But the colour is
subjective: it only exists in your brain. (This is not some wild
hypothesis, I'm talking science here. I'm talking about the essence of
colour constancy) If it only exists in you brain, how can you reproduce
it on a device? You simply can't.
This is one of the most common metaphysical labyrinths unravelled in
mainstream Anglo-American 'ordinary language philosophy' since the
mid-thirties (a misnomer for descriptive logic that describes what it
actually makes sense to say as opposed to normative logic that
prescribes cures for the fictitious ailment that we have yet to
figure out how to make sense ... sort of an odd project many have
embarked upon, when you stop to think about it -:)).
There are literally hundreds of papers that will help you out of this
misconception about color, or misconception about pain which is
another all time favourite for those who wish to claim that private
sensations underpin the concept of making sense or being language.
And no, you're not talking science but runaway metaphors and analogies ... -:).