Re: [Fed-Talk] Š. (was: CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now in "In - Review"(CMVP))
Re: [Fed-Talk] Š. (was: CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now in "In - Review"(CMVP))
- Subject: Re: [Fed-Talk] Š. (was: CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now in "In - Review"(CMVP))
- From: "Villano, Paul Mr CIV USA TRADOC" <email@hidden>
- Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 10:49:15 -0500
Allan I don't understand all of the angst you're perceiving or why you think
your solution is something new. What you describe sounds like what the Army
is doing with the Good(e?) solution. The whole reason I understood they were
chosen was because they follow the paradigm you mention of protecting all of
the data on the phone, not app by app. What am I missing?
-----Original Message-----
From: fed-talk-bounces+paul.villano=email@hidden
[mailto:fed-talk-bounces+paul.villano=email@hidden] On Behalf
Of Marcus, Allan B
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 10:31 AM
To: email@hidden
Subject: Re: [Fed-Talk] Š. (was: CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now in "In -
Review"(CMVP))
Again, thanks for the taking the time to answer. I'm not going to let this
drop. I also have to admit that I'm getting frustrated with the pedantic
nature of your replies.
As for being pedantic, take for example, your comment regarding login vs
unlock. Wikipedia describes login as
"In computer security, a login or logon refers to the credentials required
to obtain access to a computer system or other restricted area"
I submit that when a user takes an iPhone and enters a password to unlock
the iPhone, she has done the above. As the iOS device is not a multi-user
device, there is not a username to identify the user, just the password as
the credentials to obtain access to a computer system. Based on the
definition you gave, the user is logging-in as well as unlocking.
I'm going to rant a little now, but I think what I'm saying is fairly well
agreed upon by anyone on the federal government providing iOS devices.
When talking about working with developers "given the need to mitigate
these risks and what is available today", I submit the most practical
solution for the entire federal government is to pressure Apple to provide
for a complete data protection solution. Any other approach is essentially
futile. You also spoke of the capability to leverage third parties to
provide solutions, but IOS is different from Mac and Windows. Desktop
operating systems are not nearly as locked down as iOS. That control, which
Apple insists upon, also puts more responsibility on Apple to provide
solutions, since third parties cannot. Whole device data protection (for
lack of a better term, and not wanting to trigger your Pavlovian response
that the device is already encrypted) is not a solution a third party can
provide on iOS (as they can on OS X). The ONLY provider than can provide
this is Apple.
You seemingly managed to ignore my comment
"When I say I want a global/system solution to turn it on, I mean in
the System App. I wan enhanced data protection for all apps, all the time.
Yes, I want the user to have to enter a password to do anything on the
device except make an emergency call (or a regular call by entering the
number directly). "
I will refer to this option as "whole device data protection (T)." WDDP is a
trademark owned by Allan Marcus and can be licensed for a small fee :-) If
Apple implemented it, I will sign over the trademark to Apple for no fee!
The only vendor that can provide this is Apple. I'm sure you have heard this
request before. You state Apple "we will not destroy the user experience".
For those of use that comply with the FISMA law and use Good, don't you
think that Apple's lack of whole device data protection has force use to
"destroy the user experience" by using Good?
Also, please take a few minutes and explain how using data protection for
all data on the device will "destroy the user experience". I assume some
things will not work, like certain background syncing or processing, but if
there were a Yes/No slider in the general System panel to turn on "whole
device data protection", the user could easily be warned that certain things
would not work with that option. Apple allows the user to turn off cellular,
bluetooth, wifi, and a ton of other settings that could "destroy the user
experience".
For example, I submit my iPhone SUCKS when I turn on Airplane mode!
Why the heck does Apple DESTROY my user experience when I turn turn on
Airplane mode! My device's user experience is also destroyed when I turn off
siri. Why does apple allow that, but not whole device data protection? Apple
let's me exclude certain data from spotlight searches. I submit that when I
exclude mail from spotlight searches and then I search and forget that I've
turned off mail and no mail comes up in a search, my iPhone is _broken_.
Obviously these are ridiculous assumptions to be made on the part of the
user. These are options that the user can turn on/off, and once on/off the
user should not expect those options to function. The same can easily be
said for whole device data protection option. Let the user decide to give up
a little functionality to gain the security.
I realize you cannot talk about future features. What I would like to hear
is who do I have to talk to for this feature to be seriously considered for
a future iOS?
--
Thanks,
Allan Marcus
Chief IT Architect
Los Alamos National Laboratory
505-667-5666
email@hidden
From: Shawn Geddis <email@hidden>
Date: Wednesday, February 20, 2013 4:21 PM
To: Allan Marcus <email@hidden>
Cc: "email@hidden" <email@hidden>
Subject: Re: [Fed-Talk] .. (was: CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now in "In -
Review"(CMVP))
Allan,
On Feb 20, 2013, at 4:48 PM, "Marcus, Allan B" <email@hidden> wrote:
I don't think you are getting, or acknowledging, LANL's
requirements.
Respectfully, I do understand, but an apology to you if you felt I was not
properly acknowledging it. Our discussions on important topics such as
these here should always be open and with honest challenges from all sides.
No one is trying to skirt the issues, but rather face the issues head on
together to improve on the working computing environments for everyone - as
much as possible.
That said, please allow me to address your most recent comments here. I
know people must be getting tired of hearing from me on this today, so I'll
try to do the best I can here and then allow folks to move on to more
pressing communication and other topics.
This has been good to discuss and I hope folks do not shy away from doing so
in the future.
Working with individual app developers is not feasible.
We are not saying this is the ideal situation or one that scales for
a single agency to work with every developer offering Apps, but are speaking
about the best way to attack this particular problem given the need to
mitigate these risks and what is available today. I will say that many of
the App developers that are providing solutions leveraging the Enhanced Data
Protection did so solely because they were approached by large customers
with specific needs that the developer was willing / able to meet. This
lead those developers to then incorporate those capabilities into their
Commercial App Store offerings. It all starts with the developers. As more
incorporate this into their Apps the better it is for you and every other
customer - regardless of what the vertical market may be.
For example, I want notes and calendar encrypted. Please
tell me who at Apple I speak with to make that happen? I then have to
contact Google about Drive. Then I have to talk to DropBox, Microsoft, and
potentially hundreds of other developers to get them to flip a bit on their
app? That is not feasible.
Any need a customer has of any platform ultimately results in the
customer communicating that to the provider. I hope you would agree that
has been what you have been doing all along with your desktop/laptop systems
as well over the years -- with Apple, Microsoft, Google, etc. Effective
communication by customers and solid integration of those selected
capabilities by vendors is what makes products better equipped to meet the
needs of the individuals involved. Coming up with innovative ways to both
solve the problems in a meaningful way and advance the platform is nirvana.
When I say I want a global/system solution to turn it on, I
mean int he System App. I wan enhanced data protection for all apps, all the
time. Yes, I want the user to have to enter a password to do anything on the
device except make an emergency call (or a regular call by entering the
number directly).
I have refrained from bringing up BB, but I will at this
time. Their entire phone is FIPS certified.
Folks who know me, expected me to stop here... :-) Respectfully, A
Phone is not FIPS Certified. The cryptographic module used by Applications
and Services on the device has been FIPS 140-2 Validated - Absolutely! The
unfortunately thing about FIPS 140-2 is that it does not involve the review,
validation or touch at all on ANY of the Processes, Applications or Devices
that USE that cryptography outside of the boundary of the cryptographic
module. To say it provides anything more is unfortunately not true. As I
was noting the other day, I product could actually use a FIPS 140-2
Validated Module with a NON-Approve Algorithm - not FIPS 140-2 Compliant at
that point. I hope people really would read more about what FIPS 140-2
Validation Promises and what it doesn't promise. There is so much
misinformation about it throughout the community. For most it comes down to
a checkmark and once they see a checkmark, it seems to take on a life of its
own.
I'll step down from my rant here... :-)
Everything on the phone is encrypted/protected until the
user authenticates (that is what I mean by "pre-use" authentication).
If the phone is on, but the user is not logged in, I cannot
access any _user_ data on the device. That is what I would like to see for
the iPhone. When the phone is on, but the suer is not logged in, I cannot
access any user data on the device.
Right now I can copy a file (using itunes) to an app's
sandbox on the iPhone/iPad.
That is possible with iTunes only for Applications that have
intentionally assigned the ability to share files via itunes. That is a
specific API for developers to leverage. It was very necessary back in the
days where iTunes was at the heart of all Comms to the iPhone/iPad/iPod
touch. Since iOS 5 broke free from the requirements of being tethered to a
computer, value add and use of that has sloped off significantly.
I can then plug the device into any Mac, use iExplorer (or
similar tool) and copy that file to the computer. Yes, _if_ the developer
had implemented a class key above 7 (I think) that data would be safe, but
since App developers generally don't do that, we have a problem.
I am not sure what the reference is to Class Key above 7, but I
think you mean to say the Developers need to protect sensitive files in
Class A - "ProtectionComplete". With that I couldn't agree more! We are on
the same page with that.
All customers such as yourself have much more power than maybe you
are giving yourself credit for. All developers, solutions providers, etc.
need paying customers. Customers vote with their money.
Yes, the iOS device _can_ be safe, but that is not good
enough for government CUI data. We need for the device to always have the
data encrypted, protected, and unavailable unless the user is logged in.
hence the need for an App like Good, which degrades the user experience
considerably.
A point of clarification here. Users of an iOS device do not "log"
into the device, but rather "unlock" the device. I am not picking on the
way you said it here, but using this opportunity to point this out to many
who do not know or understand that point. Each time a user "unlocks" the
device, they are providing iOS with a non-stored value which is used as part
of the tangled key for unlocking various Class keys. Prior to that "unlock"
(while the device is running but is locked) those higher level Class Keys
are unavailable to iOS and hence the Files are unable to be decrypted in any
way by the OS or otherwise.
The very good point that you have been making all along is that it
only has this great protection of the files, if the developer properly
utilizes the iOS provided services. I couldn't agree more with you on this.
However, forcing ALL Applications and their data into "ProtectionComplete"
now destroys the possibility of the devices to enable things like receive
push mail, notifications (local or remote), alarms, MDM, etc. until the user
would unlock the device and launch that specific application. It is not a
usable scenario for the vast majority of users around the world including
those in the federal government.
I don't know what magic BB does to allow pushed e-mail, but
I assume whatever they are doing it passed muster with the Feds.
Assumption or verification ? :-) Remember, it comes down to risk
management.
I hope you understand what I'm requesting. Please let me
know if there is a way to implement this, or if Apple has a solution that
will be coming out.
Apple is constantly working on raising the bar of data protection,
despite users and developers :-), but we will not destroy the user
experience. Some may choose to select third-party solutions on top of what
iOS provides to achieve a level of assurance and risk they feel is
acceptable. Many of those solutions do negatively impact the user
experience, but may be a solution chosen by certain organizations. There
will always be value for some in using a value added solution by a
third-party. Everyone can't get everything they need from a single entity -
it would be nice, but is not realistic.
With respect to your other message sent later...
From: "Marcus, Allan B" <email@hidden>
Subject: Re: [Fed-Talk] CoreCrypto / CoreCrypto Kernel now
in "In - Review"(CMVP)
Date: February 20, 2013 4:52:13 PM EST
To: "email@hidden" <email@hidden>
I believe Apple has solved this issue with the keychains.
As for the chicken and egg, it is irrelevant which came
first as long as KFC is last! :-)
I guess I am not understanding the context of this to be able to properly
respond without potentially going off on the wrong path. I am always open
to being educated :-)
- Shawn
________________________________________
Shawn Geddis T (703) 264-5103
Security Consulting Engineer C (703) 623-9329
Apple Enterprise Division email@hidden
11921 Freedom Drive, Suite 600, Reston VA 20190-5634
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